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THE FEDERAL POWER ACT.
The states in which are situate the public lands, containing
abundant water and potential water power, had for many years
prior to the World War urged the privilege of fuller develop-
ment on these lands of hydro-electric power and storage facili-
ties for irrigation, to serve the industrial and agricultural wel-
fare of such states. The shortage of coal supply and the needs
of industry and agriculture, during the -war, caused a recognition
that the hydro-electric development within the United States
was below that of other industrial nations. The above facts,
together with the desire of Congress for national control, re-
sulted in the Act of Congress, approved June 10, 1920,1 known
as the Federal Power Act, being endorsed as an administration
measure during President Wilson's term.
Certain legislative history of the Act is well stated as
follows:
"This Act is the fruit of two independent bills introduced
in the Congress more than five years ago. One of them, called
the Navigable Water Bill, was designed for the construction of
dams and reservoirs in navigable waters, for the double pur-
pose of improving navigation and the harnessing of the surplus
water in rocky and shoaly courses, where it was deemed best by
Congress under the plan to improve the navigability by the slack-
water method; the other, called the Public Land Bill, had for its
main purposes the devotion of flowing streams to power uses
and for the impounding of water on the government domain or
reservation for irrigation in furtherance of farm development.
"The two bills had one element in common-the develop-
ment of power. The first sought to confer jurisdiction or ad-
ministration upon the Secretary of War; the other conferred like
power on the Secretary of Interior and the Secretary of Agricul-
ture. These measures never became laws because the Senate and
the House of Represertatives could not agree upon the forms
and all the provisions. Finally the two pieces of proposed legis-
lation were in material respects combined into the one now called
the Federal Water Power Act." 2
141 Stat. at L. zo63.
'Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 Fed. 6a6,g.
(142)
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The Federal Power Act creates a Commission consisting of
the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Interior, and the
Secretary of Agriculture, which is given full authority to admin-
ister the provisions of the Act. The Commission is authorized
to make investigations and collect data concerning the utilization
of witer resources of any region subject to development and
the relation of the water power industry to other industries and
to interstate and foreign commerce; and to make public the
data thus secured. The Commission has the power to hold
hearings and take testimony pertaining to matters which it is
directed to control. Also, the Commission is empowered to issue
licenses, for a period not greater than fifty years, for any physi-
cal structure necessary or convenient for a water power develop-
ment, or for the utilization of water power (whether or not for
the improvement of navigation), if the development, transmis-
sion and utilization of power be across, from or in any navigable
waters or upon any part of the public lands. The Act provides
for the Commission's control over the licensee, the licensee's de-
.velopment and business, and for the re-capture of complete units
of water power developments.
The requirements of the Act for Federal permits, or licenses,
to protect or improve navigation on the navigable waters of the
United States, or for the physical use of public lands, or Govern-
ment dams, demand no discussion, being beyond question a mat-
ter within Federal authority. However, the provisions of the
Act which apparently assume control over all water power de-
velopments and the business administration thereof, if any part
of the project is across, along, from or in navigable waters, or
on public lands, or benefits by or uses a Government dam or struc-
* ture, raises an issue with fundamental principles established by
our national Constitution. And our purpose is to consider herein
the clauses of the Act which appear to be based upon an assump-
tion at variance with the basic law of the land. A resum6 of
the clauses or parts of the Act which present the issue under
discussion may be stated as follows:
A. The Commission is authorized to issue licenses to
citizens of the United States or to any State or municipality
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thereof for constructing, operating and maintaining dams,
water conduits, reservoirs, power houses, transmission lines,
or other project works:
(i) For the development and improvement of naviga-
tion; and
(2) For the development, transmission and utilization
of power across, along, from or in any of the navigable wa-
ters of the United States, or
(3) Upon any part of the public lands.of the United
States, or
(4) For the purpose of utilizing the surplus water or
water power from any Government dam.3
B. All applicants for a license must submit to the Com-
mission all plans and estimates of costs, which when ap-
proved by the Commission shall be a part of the license;.
and except in emergency no change or addition of plan
shall be made without the consent of the Commission. 4
C. After the first twenty years of operation, out of the
surplus earned thereafter, the licensee shall establish and
maintain amortization reserves, as specified in the license.3
D. The licensee shall pay the United States reasonable
annual charges for reimbursing the United States:
(i) for the cost of administration of the Act;
(2) for the use of its lands; and
(3) for the ex-propriation to the Government of ex-
cessive profits, until the respective states shall make provi-
sion for preventing excessive profits.6
E. Whenever any licensee is benefited by the construc-
tion made by another licensee, or by the United States, of a
storage reservoir or other headwater improvement, the li-
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to the owner of such construction as the Commission may
determine.7
F. Upon not less than two years' notice in writing
from the Commission the United States shall have the right,
upon or after the expiration of any license, to take over
and thereafter to maintain and operate any project or pro-
jects as defined in Section 3 and covered in whole or in part
by the license, upon the condition that before taking pos-
session it shall pay the net investment of the licensee in the
project or projects taken, not to exceed the fair value of
the property taken, plus such reasonable damages to prop-
erty of the licensee caused by the severance therefrom of
property taken, and shall assume all contracts entered into
by the licensee with the approval of the Commission.' The
net investment of the licensee in the project so taken it is
provided shall not include, inter alia, good will, going value,
prospective values; also values allowed ior water rights,
rights of way, lands or interest therein shall not exceed ac-
tual reasonable cost at the time licensee acquired same."
G. If the United States does not, at the expiration of
the original license, take over, the project, the Commission
may issue a new license to the old or to a new licensee.'
H. The Commission (as a condition of the license)
shall regulate and control the development, transmission and
public service made or rendered by any licensee, provided,
however, that the Commission shall have no jurisdiction
when the State shall have a commission, or other authority,
for the regulation or control of the specific matter involved.1 "
L When said power or any part thereof shall enter
into interstate or foreign commerce, whenever any of the
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other authority, to supervise rates or service or issues of
securities, or the states are unable to agree through their
authorities on service, or rates, or issues of securities, the
Commission shall have jurisdiction to determine the same.11
If Federal authority exists for. the broad and specific powers
directed by these clauses to be exercised by the Federal Power
Commission, then it necessarily follows that the franchise, giv-
ing control and regulation of all water power development, in-
cluded under the Act, is vested in the United States and not in
the respective States.
Fundamental laws of our dual system of government con-
trol the issue under discussion. The basic principles involved are
those which determine jurisdiction over the waters within the
United States and over the business and property of citizens,
natural and corporate. It may aid our purpose to recall at this
time the clauses of the Constitution and decisions of the Supreme
Court germane to the provisions of the. Act under consideration:
SOVEREIGNTY AND JURISDICTION OVER WATERS.
When the American Revolution took place the people of
each state became themselves sovereign with absolute title to the
soil, streams and water of their respective States as against any
other state or nation. After the formation of the United States
each state continued to be vested with the sovereignty of its soil
and waters, subject only to rights surrendered to the Ulaited
States under the Constitution adopted. 12 Under the commerce
clause of the Constitution's all navigable waters used, or sus-
ceptible of being used, for interstate and foreign commerce, are
subject to regulations of the United States for the protection of
such commerce. As jurisdiction or powers over all other navi-
gable and all non-navigable waters were "not delegated to the
United States by the Constitutiont nor prohibited by it to the
"Sec. 2.
"* Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367.
"Art. r, see. &
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States," such waters are, under the Tenth Amendment, reserved
unto the absolute jurisdiction and control of the respective states
or to the people. 14
A state may make its classification of navigable waters, in
order to determine its rules of property, or riparian rights; 1"
however, under the Constitution of the United States, navigable
waters must be navigable in fact, that is, used or susceptible of
being used in their natural state for interstate or foreign com-
merce by the usual modes of transportation by water.. The test
of what are navigable waters under the Constitution is whether
the same are used, or natural to be used, as highways of inter-
state or foreign commerce; it matters not whether the stream
so used is broken by rapids or fjlls.
The first case, defining navigable waters under the Consti-
tution, to add the phrase "or susceptible of being used" in inter-
state or foreign commerce was The Danici Ball.16 The signifi-
cance of the words "susceptible of being used" was the fact that
many navigable streams were not used to carry interstate and for-
eign commerce because the country had not been sufficiently de-
vdoped to create any commerce. The shores, the soil under all
waters in the state, and the water itself remain vested in the
state, subject only to the jurisdiction of the United States to
regulate interstate or foreign commerce on the navigable wa-
ters.17  Thus, the United States has no control or jurisdiction of
streams or parts of streams not used, and not susceptible of being
used, in their natural state for interstate or foreign commerce;
the control, or jurisdiction thereof being reserved to the state, or
its people, under the Tenth Amendment. Likewise, the non-
navigable headwaters of a navigable stream are solely under the
sovereignty of the state wherein situate. This does not mean,
however, that the waters of the non-navigable headwaters could
' 4McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316, 4o6; The Daniel Ball, zo
Wall. 557; The Montello; ri Wall. 411; Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U. S. 574;
U. S. v. Rio Grande, etc., Co., 174 U. S. 690; Leovy V. U. S., 177 U. S. 621;
Kansas v. Colorado, 2o6 U. S. 46.
' St. Anthony Falls Co. v. St. Paul Commissioners, 168 U. S. 349.
'The Daniel Ball, supra, note x4.
' Pollard's Lessees v. Hagan, 3 How. 212.
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be diverted to the extent of lessening the navigability of water
.below used in interstate or foreign commerce."8
The Constitution grants no power to the Federal Govern-
ment whereby Congress may authorize the utilization, or the con-
trol of the utilization, of the waters of a state for water power
or otherwise. The states -reserved the regulating, franchise-
giving or licensing authority over all waters, navigable or non-
navigable, within their boundaries. Only for the protection of
interstate and foreign commerce has the Federal Government
any jurisdiction, and that, as to the physical phase of the stream
or water, is limited, practically, to the requirement that any struc-
ture upon, on or over a navigable stream must be approved by
the national Government as not interfering with commerce.
POLICE POWERS, MANUFACTURING AND COMMERCE.
Further, the sovereignty of the state over its citizens, in-
cluding corporate citizens, was not granted or surrendered to the'
United States except as expressly or. necessarily implied under
the Constitution. All business, manufacturing and otherwise, of
its citizens, not of an interstate or foreign commerce character
(or subject to the Eighteenth Amendment), is subject only to the
laws and sovereignty of the states, except as affected by taxation,
or, the remote case which might arise under the right of eminent
domain. Otherwise, Congress has not the power or authority
under the commerce clause, or any other provision of the Con-
stitution, to limit or restrict the right of corporations created by
the states, or the citizens of the states, in the acquisition, control
and disposition of property. Neither can Congress regulate or
prescribe the price or prices at which such property or the ap-
purtenances thereof shall be sold by the owner or owners thereof,
whether a corporation or an individual.19
The power to regulate commerce does not include the right
to destroy or impair the limitations or reservations or guaranties
"'XKansas v. Colorado, rupra, note 14; U. S. v. Rio Grande, .supra, note
14. S"In re Greene, 52 Fed. 1o4; Weeds v. U. S, 255 U. S. zog; Kidd v.
Pearson, 128 U. S. i, 2o; International Paper Co. v. Mass., 246 U. S. 135;
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., (Child Labor Tax Case) 259 U. S. 2.
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placed in the Constitution and its amendments. Congress has
the power absolutely to control, regulate and dispose of the pub
lic lands, but under the guise of terms of control or disposal no
new power can thereby be vested in the United States, or the
rights reserved unto the states, or their people., be destroyed.
20
No act of Congress can amend the Constitution. No agreement
by the United States with a natural or. corporate citizen of a
state can oust or limit the state's sovereignty.
CONST1TUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE FEDERAL POWER AcT.
The history and terms of the Federal Power Act disclose
that it deals primarily with water power development (not lim-
ited to governmental purposes) on the navigable waters and-
public lands rather than with navigation. The verbiage of the
Act indicates that those who drafted its clauses were governed
more by a purpose to express certain objects they desired than
by a recognition of the necessity to conform to the Constitu-
tional powers and limitations of the United States. The Act, at
least, has many expressions broad enough, of themselves, to in-
clude powers never granted to the United States, either explicitly
or as incidental to powers granted. Nevertheless, the general
purpose of the Act and the formation of another bureau thereby,
compel recognition of the Act's present and future importance.
As previously stated, any structure on, over or in navigable
waters has always been subject to the permit, or approval, of
the United States, and its further control to compel future
changes or removal as far as necessary for the protection and im-
provement of navigation. 21 Congress may direct a commission,
board or officers to exercise its discretion. Likewise, as to leas-
ing, controlling, using or disposing of public lands, or Govern-
ment dams, the term or terms of such permits, in accordance with
law, are for Congress to declare.
However, the Federal Power Act does not limit the control
or license for the improvement or protection of navigation, but
McCulloch v. IMaryland, 4 Wheaton 316, 423; U. S. v. Joint Traffic
Asso., 171 U. S. 5o5.
'Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., iA How. 421.
ISo UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA L4W REVIEW
additional authority or jurisdiction is assumed over water, water
power developments and the owners thereof. Likewise, as to pub-
lic lands, the Act does not limit the power of the Commission
to declare whether or not the use is a proper one to be made
of public lands, and the incident terms of rent, duration of lease
or actual disposal thereof at a price. The Act assumes owner-
ship of the water and an authority over citizens, corporations,
municipalities and states in the development of any project of
water powers, if any part of the project is across, along, from
or in navigable waters or on public lands, which is opposed to
the principle so often reiterated by the Supreme Court of the
United States, that the-state is absolute sovereign of all shores,
beds of streams and waters within its boundary, subject only to
the regulation necessary or advisable for interstate and foreign
commerce.
The most comprehensive provision of the Act is that if any
part (minor or major) of a water power development requires
a Federal permit or license, then the Commission shall have con-
trol of the entire project, its plan of development, and its busi-
ness administration. To illustrate: If a primary transmission
line crossed navigable waters of the United States, public lands,
or a Government dam, and a Federal permit or license was
granted therefor, the Commission would, under the terms of the
Act, assume control of the entire project, its present and future
development, its service, rates and business, although no other
part of the project (except said transmission line) required the
consent or approval of the United States. There is no authority
under the Constitution upon which to base such an assumed
power and it could not exist unless the United States were granted
the franchise-giving control and regulation of the water power
resources which are vested in the states, having been reserved
under the Tenth Amendment.
That the United States could secure such additional juris-
diction by writing its authority therefor into a permit or license
(for another and separate purpose over which it has jurisdiction)
needs only to be stated to show its legal fallacy, The powers
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reserved to the states cannot be transferred to the United States
by direction of Congress.
Also, the Act does not limit the Commission's control to
excess of water power primarily generated for Governmental
purposes, but includes "utilizing the surplus water" from a dam,
which assumes Federal ownership in the water.-
If a water power development upon navigable waters be
made by the state, or those it authorizes, provided the project
works be such, and so placed, that interstate and foreign com-
merce regulations of the United States are complied with, all
other powers over such development are vested in the state.
The system of accounting, future developments and maintenance
of the project, rates, costs, ex-propriation of profits, issues of
securities, and payment to owners of developments on head-
waters in the same streams because of benefit to the lower owner,
are all matters solely under the sovereignty of the state as to
which the United States has no jurisdiction whatsoever. Even
if a citizen, natural or corporate, or a municipality applied for
and accepted a license from the United States containing all the
proposed items of the Act and "such further conditions not in-
consistent with the provisions of this Act as the Commission may
require," such a license or agreement could not oust the state's
sovereignty or add to the jurisdiction of the United States.
The provisions that rates and charge of payments therefor,
or the amount or character of securities issued, shall be under the
Commission,-provided the state has not authorized and em-
powered an agency to regulate and control such services,-is
anomalous. The state has the sole authority in such matters.
If the state, for its own reasons, does not create any such com-
mission or agency, that is clearly its privilege. That its failure
to do, in its own affairs, what Congress considers it should do,
ipso facto vests jurisdiction in the United States over such mat-
ters, by an agreement with a licensee or otherwise, is absolutely
without Constitutional basis.
If the requirement of the Act that all plans of development
of water power must be submitted to and be approved by the
Commission were limited, on navigable waters, to .regulating
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interstate and foreign commerce, or on public lands, to a proper
use7 of and reimbursement for the use of the land, it would be
clearly within the authority of the United States. However, the
purport of the terms of the Act is to require the approval by the
Commission of water power developments, purely as utilization
of the water resources of-the state, which is not included within
the delegated powers of the United States. Regulation of com-
merce does not-require and never has included an appropriation,
or confiscation, of the rights of a state in its natural resources;
whether or not a plan for a water power development is a proper
use of the water resources of the state is solely a. matter of the
state's concern.
If improvements on waters made by an upper owner of
riparian rights are incidentally of benefit to the improvements of
a lower owner on the same waters, whether or not the lower
owner shall be compelled to pay tribute to such upper owner, is
a matter controlled absolutely by the statutes of the state and
not by the Federal Power Act or 'any, act of Congress. The
United States itself as an owner of public lands is subject to
the riparian laws of the state Wvhere its lands are situate.22 Acts
of Congress cannot create or limit riparian rights of the state
or its citizens; they are reserved under the Tenth Amendment
23
The re-capture clause, while not specified, to be in all li-
censes, may be included if the Commission so decides. Under
the re-capture clause, if any portion of the physical structures
of a project (including transmission lines) be situate in, over
or on navigable waters or public lands, then at the end of the
license period, upon a basis of valuation set forth in the Act,
the United States may become the owner of the entire project
or projects. In other words, in addition to regulating when and
in what manner the structures may be constructed, the proper
use of and reimbursement for use of public lands, the Act di-
rects that the- United States may control and finally may own
the entire project, solely because it is a water power development.
"Kansas v. Colorado, supra, note 14.
'Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 381..
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If the Act were applicable only to waters of the District of
Columbia and Territories the assumption of the United States
of ownership and control of their respective water resources
would be admitted. And further, if the re-capture clause pro--
vided only that such water powers should be acquired by the
United States as are necessary or advisable for governmental
purposes, no mere assumption of right without basis would ex-
ist; but there is no authority or power in the United States un-
der the Constitution to acquire or take or control the business
of water powers merely for the reason they are water power
developments.
The terms provided under the Act upon which the United
States may re-capture, or take over, a project are, in fact, an
attempt to exercise eminent- domiin without the due process of
law and just compensation provided-by the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution. Congress may determine the public tse but.
the United States, through its executive or legislative repre,
sentatives, cannot fix the price if a property is "taken." Requir-
ing, as a condition of a license, an "agreement" to determine the
"just compensation" for the future taking of a property by the
original cost thereof does not square with a free will bargain
and it would not, in fact, be the "fair value" at the time of
taking.
The words "duie process of law" are intended to secure the
individual from the exercise of governmental powers ur'e-
strained by the established principles of private rights and dis-
tributive justice.2 4 The right to take private property for pub-
lic use can be exercised only upon the condition that just com-
pensation for the property at the time of taking is paid.25, If an
Act of Congress could require a license and then enforce as a.
condition of the license that the compensation (in the event of
the Government taking the property covered by the license) shall
be otherwise than the fair value thereof at the time of taking,
the result would be pro tanto to destroy the purport of the
Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheaton 235.
=Garrison v. New York, 21 Wall. x96; Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. AU,.
General, z24 U. S. 58z, e9.
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I
Amendment. Determination of the fair value is a judicial, not a
legislative procedure, under the Fifth Amendment.
If .the structures are approved as not obstructing navigation,
or if the use is approved as proper for public lands and a proper
rent paid for such use, the question as to what consideration
exists for the "agreement" would be very pertinent.
We recognize that if a plan for water power development
includes using the physical stiucture of a government dam, then
a contract charge therefor could not be questioned, as such
would be for use of property of the United States. To provide,
however, that the benefit of the storage of such dam could be
charged for against a lower owner-would be an unauthorized in-
trusion upon state sovereignty, being a charge for resources not
owned by the United States, but subject only to the control or
ownership of the state.
The right of a state, upon making public improvements
upon a stream, to charge for the use of surplus water therefrom
has been confused in the minds of some writers as establishing
that the same right was vested in the national Government. The
fact has been overlooked that, by the Tenth Amendment, the
usufruct of the water, was reserved unto the states and any claim
therefor must thereby be under the state. Two cases have fre-
quently been urged as authority for the right of the national Gov-
ernment to lease, or charge for, the usufruct of excess water
incidentally due to improvements made for navigation, Kaukauna
Co. v. Creen Bay Co., and Green Bay Co. v. Patten.2 6 The cases
are not in point. In the first case the question was not involved,
it being an issue merely between a state and a riparian owner;
and in the latter case the right of the Federal Government to
the water was by virtue of a specific grant under an act of the
legislature of the state concerned, including the title to the use
of the water itself, which was conveyed to and became vested in
the Federal Government. Therefore the right in the latter case
was under the specific grant of the state concerned to the United
S'Kaukauna Co. v. Green Bay Co., x42 'L. S. 254; Green Bay Co. v.
Patten, 172 U. S. S&
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States and not under the general authority of the commerce
clause of the Constitution.
The provisions 27 that apply "when said power or any part
thereof shall enter into interstate or foreign commerce" and
those setting forth certain regulations, among others, that the
administration of the section shall be a'nalogousto the procedure
and practice as to railroad companies as provided in the Act
to Regulate Commerce of February 4, 1887, as amended, indi-
cate a desire to cover a future possibility rather than to provide
for any present status. Incidents of, or aids to, commerce are
not necessarily commerce. All business has a relation to com-
merce, but all business is not commerce. Hydro-electric plants
convert energy from falling water into electric current, and the
operation of such plants is not tommerce.2s Transmission of
current by a company from one state to another may or may
not be interstate commerce subject to regulation by the United
States. In The Pipe Line Cases,29 where the Supreme Court of
the United States probably reached the extreme of logic in
declaring a new class of common carriers, the facts and circum-
stances which controlled the Court are in no wise pertinent to•
the transmission line of a hydro-electric plant passing from one
state to another. The clear statements of the Supreme Court
of the United States in the decisions referred to above, apply-
ing the Constitutional principles pertinent to the present subject,
would appear *not to justify any assumption of Federal juris-
diction over -water power developments as such.
The Federal Government as a. riparian owner and otherwise
as an owner of Public Lands, Government dams, and projects,
may enter into contracts as to the use of its property, as may
any other such owner; but such contracts must conform to the
sovereignty and laws of the state wherein the property is situate.
The United States for its governmental purposes may develop
water power. but there is no Constitutional authority for the
=Sec. 20.
'Kidd v. Pearson, supra, note ig; Crescent Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257.
U. S. 129.
"234 U. S. 348.
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United States entering upon the business of water power de-
velopment, as such; neither is there any Constitutional basis
for the United States assuming the general control of rates, serv-
ice and issue of securities of- water power utilities, nor the right
eventually to re-capture such water power projects.
Practically, it may be .said, Federal control of navigation,
public lands, and Government dams, would naturally result in a
consideration of possible water power developments, even though
advisory in character, in that the Federal officer (or commis-
sion) authorized to determine whether a proposed structure in,
or over, navigable waters is proper for the protection of naviga-
tion, would undoubtedly advise any change of structure, or loca-
tion, that.would give the same results to navigation and secure
greater water power development, although the jurisdiction of
the United States extends only to the needs of navigation.
Similarly, in granting the use of any part of the public lands
for a water power project, if -a greater maximum water power
could be secured by a project different from the one proposed,
such different project would be favored and urged. However,
'the fact of such practical co-relation would not create Federal
jurisdiction, nor oust State sovereignty, over the utilization of
the water power resources as is apparently assumed by the
Federal Power Act.30 31
John Franklin Shields.
Philadelphia, Pa.
"An interesting academic question of the constitutionality of the Fed-
eral Power Act, but not pertinent to the merits of the Act, is presented by
these facts: The Federal- Power Act was finally passed by Congress May
28, 1920, and presented to the President May 31, i92. Congress adjourned
June 5, i92o. The Power Act was signed, or approved, by the President on
June 1o, 192o, or five days after Congress adjourned. The procedure has
always been to have the President sign all bills, or veto them, before Con-
gress adjourns to eliminate the question of whether a bill signed after Con-
gress had adjourned is valid. In La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United
States. 175 U. S. 421. at p. 455, the Supreme Court decided that under the
Constitution a bill duly presented during its session may be sjgfied by the
President during the recess which Congress has taken for a fixed period.
However, the Court called attention to the fact that whether the President
can sign a bill after final adjournment of Cofigress for the session is not
decided nor considered in the case. U. S. v. Veil, 29 Court of Claims 523
(r894) and _o Opinions Attorney General. 5o3, are germane to the general
clause of the Constitution involved, i. e., Section 7 of Article i.
'The Federal Power Act has not been subject to any decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States. The State of New York filed an orig-
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inal bill against certain officers of the United States (No. 22 Original, Octo-
ber Term, 192z), asserting various provisions of The Federal Power Act to
be unconstitutional. However, during the summer of 923, before the cause
came to be heard, by conference between the New York State Water Com-
mission and the Federal Power Commission, a working construction of all
essential disputes was reached and the cause in the Supreme Court of the
United States became an academic issue and thus disposed of.
A similar cause, State of New Jersey v. Certain Officers of the United
States, is now pending in the Supreme Court of the United States (No. 22
Orignal, October Term, I924). A motion to dismiss" has been filed by the
Solicitor General of the United States on the ground the original bill has not
set forth a justiciable controversy.
The only reported decision, involving The Federal Power Act, up to this
date (September, 1924) is Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 Fed.
6o6, in which Judge Clayton, of the U. S. Dist. Court, Northern and Mddle
Districts, Alabama, gives a very general discussion, and decides that the
terms of the Federal Power Act. in reference to navigable waters, apply ofily
where the proposed project works are primarily for navigation. Apparently
no appeal from the decision was made.
